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Abstract	The	article	analyses	the	experiences	and	material	impacts	of	shifting	borders	in	the	historical	case	of	Sri	Lanka’s	civil	war	and	the	contemporary	case	of	shifting	border	between	Georgia	and	South	Ossetia.	The	two	cases	point	to	some	lesser	known	geopolitical	practices	in	which	border-shifts	and	strengthening	of	control	in	contested	areas	take	place	without	much	international	attention,	partly	because	the	shifts	are	so	minor	and	gradual	that	they	do	not	reach	the	news	headlines.	Living	with	shifting	borders	create	a	state	of	inbetweenness	and	losing	of	control,	where	forms	of	visibility	and	invisibility	produces	individual	uncertainties	and	vulnerabilities	in	homeplaces	and	people’s	everyday	lives.	By	analysing	the	borderland	and	bordershifts	from	the	perspective	of	the	peripheral,	the	article	emphasises	the	ways	in	which	border	practices	become	part	of	social	action	through	a	rescaling	of	the	understanding	of	the	border	encouraged	by	feminist	geopolitics.	The	article	begins	by	discussing	what	borders	may	mean	and	how	borders	shift	and	may	produce	particular	forms	of	visibility	and	invisibility.	Then	the	contexts	of	the	Sri	Lankan	and	Georgian	villages	are	introduced	before	a	short	discussion	of	the	methods	applied.	The	article	then	analyses	how	the	bordershifts	create	particular	material	and	symbolic	outcomes,	an	experience	of	‘displacement	in	place,	and	the	particular	invisibilities	created	on	the	ground	in	the	two	cases.	The	article	concludes	by	reflecting	on	how	border-practices	produce	forms	of	visibility	and	invisibility	that	continue	to	render	people	in	the	borderlands	peripheral.		
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In	the	Borderlands	
	 you	are	the	battleground	
	 where	enemies	are	kin	to	each	other;		
	 you	are	at	home,	a	stranger,		
the	border	disputes	have	been	settled	
the	volley	of	shots	have	shattered	the	truce	
you	are	wounded,	lost	in	action	
dead,	fighting	back;			
	
(…)		
	
To	survive	the	Borderlands	
	 you	must	live	sin	fronteras1	
	 be	a	crossroads.2	 			
Introduction	Borders	and	borderlands	are	imprinted	by	contested	powers,	they	are	not	stable	entities,	they	change	character,	they	may	be	strengthened,	demarcated	in	new	ways,	and	they	may	shift.	When	a	border	shifts,	physically,	materially,	socially	or	symbolically,	it	creates	insecurity	and	radical	uncertainty	for	some,	particularly	for	those	in	the	borderland.	The	borderland,	or	the	frontier,	is	an	ambivalent	–	and	often	violent	–	place	as	the	poem	above	by	Gloria	Anzaldúa3	illustrates.	The	frontier	may	be	both	peripheral	and	central	at	the	same	time;	it	may	form	the	margin	of	a	territory,	but	is	often	strategically	and	militarily	very	important.	The	border	represents	a	central	demarcation	of	the	borderland.	With	shifting	borders,	the	frontier	becomes	an	unstable,	unpredictable	and	unsettled	place.		While	borderlands	may	be	strategically	important,	Goodhand4	shows	that	borderlands	are	often	neglected	by	policymakers	where	a	state-centred	view	of	the	world	is	more	prominent.	People	dwelling	in	the	borderland	are	often	considered	peripheral	to	the	state	and	neglected,	rendered	invisible	and	silenced.	Frontiers	may	enable	a	particular	control	of	people	and	a	certain	sense	of	exception5	This	article	addresses	the	ways	in	which	border-shifts	enable	processes	of	peripheralisation	that	intersects	with	security	politics	to	create	particular	forms	of	visibility	and	invisiblity	of	the	borderland-subjects	inhabiting	the	frontiers.	I	explore	this	experience	of	peripheralisation	by	engaging	with	two	situations	of	shifting	borders:	the	historical	case	of	eastern	Sri	Lanka	during	the	civil	war	that	ended	in	2009	and	the	current	unstable	border	between	Georgia	and	South	Ossetia.	My	intention	–	and	the	reason	for	exploring	these	cases	together	–	is	to	point	to	some	lesser	known	geopolitical	practices	in	which	border-shifts	and	strengthening	of	control	in	contested	areas	take	place	without	much	international	attention,	partly	because	the	shifts	are	so	minor	and	gradual	that	they	do	not	reach	the	news	headlines.	By	engaging	with	dynamics	and	tensions	between	visibility	and	invisibility,	I	aim	to	
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switch	the	lens	in	border	areas	from	the	macro	geopolitical	processes	of	the	moving	borders	to	the	representational	consequences	of	those	shifts	on	the	ground	and	in	people’s	everyday	lives.			Analysing	the	borderland	from	the	perspective	of	the	peripheral	and	how	it	is	experienced	in	everyday	lives	enable	a	rescaling	of	the	understanding	of	the	border	encouraged	by	feminist	geopolitics.6	I	am	inspired	by	Marieke	Borren’s7	interpretation	of	Hannah	Arendt’s8	discussion	of	power,	politics	and	the	space	of	appearance	which	opens	up	for	a	particular	exploration	of	the	ways	in	which	people	in	the	borderlands	are	rendered	invisible	and	vulnerable.	I	begin	the	article	by	discussing	what	borders	may	mean	and	how	borders	shift	and	may	produce	particular	forms	of	visibility	and	invisibility.	I	then	briefly	introduce	the	context	and	the	methodology	before	I	show	how	border-shifts	create	particular	symbolic	and	material	outcomes,	‘displacement	in	place’	and	particular	invisibilities.		
	
	
The	power	of	vision:	production	of	visibility	and	invisibility	in	the	borderland		The	material	practices	on	‘the	border’,	such	as	erecting	walls	and	barriers,	building	checkpoints	and	securitizing	the	borderlands,	have	become	main	tools	for	controlling	population	movement,	securing	resources	and	for	producing	and	enabling	symbolic	power	internationally	and	nationally.	Currently,	the	way	borders	are	theorised	may	be	traced	back	to	the	events	marking	the	end	of	the	cold	war	which	brought	‘territory’	and	‘borders’	back	into	the	popular	and	academic	imagination.	Old	states	vanished	and	new	ones	appeared	in	the	process	commonly	known	as	‘Balkanisation’9,	initially	used	to	describe	fragmentation	after	disintegration	of	the	Ottoman	and	Austro-Hungarian	empire.	Much	attention	has	been	given	to	those	wars	that	created	new	borders	and	to	regions	were	borders	have	changed	meaning10	such	as	the	borders	between	Georgia,	South	Ossetia	and	Russia.	Less	attention	is	perhaps	directed	towards	the	violence	that	reinstates	the	“national	order	of	things”,	a	one-nation	narrative,	enabled	through	a	“victor’s	peace”	such	as	in	the	case	of	Sri	Lanka’s	nearly	thirty	year	long	civil	war.11	Common	for	conflicts	where	new	borders	are	established	or	where	the	one-nation	narrative	is	re-instated	and	physical	borders	removed,	is	that	border	practices	become	part	of	social	action.	Theorising	borders	therefore	becomes	a	way	of	theorising	and	analysing	the	social.12	In	this	context,	it	is	useful	to	engage	with	feminist	geopolitics	which	challenges	the	dominant	scale	of	traditional	geopolitical	inquiry	by	drawing	attention	to	the	everyday	and	the	embodied	sites	and	discourses	through	which	transnational	economic	and	political	relations	are	forged	and	contested.13	Casolo	and	Doshi14,	for	example,	show	how	geopolitics	are	produced	and	reworked	through	place-based	meanings	and	struggles.	When	borders	shift,	violence	takes	place	through	the	interconnections	between	different	scales.15	In	re-scaling	geopolitical	inquiry,	feminist	scholars	have	attended	to	the	uneven	ways	in	which	geopolitical	processes	shape	the	lives	of	differently	situated	populations.16	Even	the	most	intimate	and	everyday	aspects	of	life	are	key	sites	where	geopolitical	power	is	(re)produced	and	negotiated.17	With	
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feminist	geopolitics,	I	consider	the	shifting	borders	analysed	here	as	the	meeting	points	between	embodied	experiences	and	geopolitical	tactics.		Border-shifts	are	expressions	of	how	economy,	culture	and	politics	come	together	as	forces	working	upon	each	other.	Sometimes,	border	practices	expand	and	move	further	away	from	the	line	that	represents	the	border	through	buffer	zones,	displacement,	and	institutional	arrangements.	Studies	have	shown	how	borders	become	diffused	throughout	society	and	extended	off-shore,	inland,	abroad	and	into	cyberspace.18	But	equally	important	for	the	analysis	here,	is	the	movement	of	physical	borders.	I	show	how	borders	are	in	a	state	of	flux	and	shift	in	many	ways:	they	may	change	location,	the	border	practices	may	dislocate,	expand	and	disappear	at	one	scale,	but	continue	to	live	on	at	other	scales.	The	cases	in	Sri	Lanka	and	Georgia	explored	in	this	article	represent	contested	borders	and	are	analysed	as	border-practices	that	aspire	to	form	or	re-establish	state	borders.	The	meaning	of	the	‘border’	in	the	two	cases	discussed	fluctuates	between	borders	that	act	like	nation	state	borders	and	borders	that	signify	boundaries	–	or	divisions	–	between	groups	of	people.			Importantly,	borderlands	–	or	the	frontiers	–	enable	and	represent	the	contested	nature	of	the	border.19	The	borders	and	borderlands	remain	spaces	of	securitisation	where	anticipation	of	violence	governs	border	practices.20	Borders	created	by	force	during	war	or	upheavals	become	reality	through	the	practices	of	those	who	manage	the	borders	and	by	those	who	have	to	cross	and	relate	to	the	borders	to	perform	their	everyday	lives.	When	the	border	is	not	given,	not	static,	and	associated	with	violence,	everyday	life	is	also	in	flux	and	displacement	takes	place	in	particular	ways	when	borders	shift	violently.	While	staying	put,	the	existence	is	split	between	here	and	there:	the	context	is	difficult	to	grasp	because	institutions	and	regulatory	regimes	change.	Living	with	shifting	borders	may	thus	result	in	a	feeling	of	inbetweenness	and	losing	of	control.	A	lost	access	to	context21	emerges	through	a	situation	similar	to,	but	not	the	same	as,	statelessness.	In	Hannah	Arendt’s22	understanding,	it	is	the	pathologies	of	political	action	and	citizenship	that	distinguishes	statelessness:	a	situation	of	public	invisibility	and	natural	visibility	in	which	people	are	rendered	speechless	in	public	life,	but	exposed	and	unprotected	in	their	homes23.	Rather	than	taking	for	granted	the	Arendtian	distinction	between	public	and	private,	the	point	here	is	the	interconnections	between	different	scales	created	by	the	shifting	borders:	The	forms	of	visibility	and	invisibility	created	at	a	societal,	national	scale,	produces	individual	and	community	uncertainties	and	vulnerabilities	in	homeplaces	and	people’s	everyday	lives.		
	Borderlands	produce	particular	visions	of	and	by	 the	subjects	 inhabiting	 them24:	 from	the	nation	state	scale,	complex	landscapes	are	reduced	to	homogenous	spaces	through	a	disembodied	 geopolitical	 reasoning25	in	 which	 invisibility	 is	 produced	 at	 multiple	scales26.	 From	 the	 borderlands,	 the	 embodied	 and	 localised	 accounts	 of	 border	 shifts	may	 effectively	 convey	 the	 production	 of	 visibility	 and	 invisibility.	 In	 formulating	 an	epistemology	of	 ‘recognition’,	Honneth27	places	 the	 relationship	between	visibility	 and	
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invisibility	 under	 scrutiny	 and	 points	 to	 two	 forms	 of	 in/visibility	 –	 a	 physical	 and	 a	social	form.	Visibility	in	the	physical	form	is	understood	as	an	individual	identification,	a	situated	and	embodied	subject,	 in	contrast	to	a	physical	 invisibility	which	represents	a	non-presence.	 In	 the	 second	 and	 more	 existential	 form,	 the	 relationship	 between	visibility	and	invisibility	is	the	contrast	between	existence	and	non-existence.	It	is	when	the	two	forms	of	in/visibility	comes	together	that	we	can	understand	cognition	and	re-cognition	 in	 Honneth’s	 proposition.	 The	 barbed	 wire,	 fences,	 military	 presence,	checkpoints,	 flags	 and	 no-go	 zones	 in	 the	 borderlands	 dominate	 the	 landscape	 and	create	new	mental	maps	that	overpower	the	presence	of	the	subjects.28	I	show	that	the	value	of	the	presence	of	civilian	subjects	in	the	borderland	is	the	continued	claim	by	the	nation	 state	 and	 groups	 aspiring	 to	 be	 the	 government	 of	 a	 particular	 territory.	 The	territory	 is	 worthless	 without	 its	 citizens,	 but	 the	 citizens	 are	 only	 recognized	 as	 an	abstract	representation	of	the	nation	state:	people	in	the	Centre	can	only	see	projections	of	themselves	in	the	borderlands;	as	a	symbol	of	their	own	national	identity	and	not	the	vulnerabilities	 that	 people	 experience.29	The	 power	 to	 imagine	 the	 borderlands	 is	subject	to	those	who	can	control	the	material	practices	of	the	border	and,	consequently,	the	 representations	 of	 the	 border.	 In	 the	 spaces	 of	 the	 border,	 however,	 the	 people	inhabiting	 the	border	continue	 to	 live	everyday	 lives	and	negotiate	 the	visibilities	and	invisibilities	 that	 are	 produced	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 very	 restriction	 that	 complex	citizenship	 and	 the	 encounter	with	 complex	powers	produce.	 ‘Burdened	 agency’	 casts	light	 on	 this	 constrained	 and	 structured	 context,	 where	 choices	 are	 often	 felt	 to	 be	between	bad	and	worse	 in	a	 situation	where	people	 in	 the	borderlands	do	not	escape	but	 have	 to	 confront	 the	powers	 that	 threaten	 them30.	 ‘Burdened	 agency’,	 inspired	by	Meyer’s	work	on	victim	paradigm	and	Cons	and	Dunn’s	work	on	camps	and	borderlands	in	Georgia,	captures	the	particular	types	of	force	and	coercion	that	come	with	a	shifting	border	 and	 that	 impact	 the	 agentive	 capacity	people	may	generate.	 Through	 the	 lived	reality	of	border-shifts,	mundane	types	of	social	injustice	that	are	of	significance	to	the	individual	 experience	 but	 often	 overlooked	 in	 more	 macro-political	 accounts	 of	 the	border	are	highlighted.31	After	a	brief	 introduction	of	context	and	methodology,	and	 in	order	 to	 understand	 how	 tensions	 between	 visibility	 and	 invisibility	 are	 produced	 on	the	 ground,	 I	 explore	 the	 material	 practices	 on	 the	 border,	 various	 forms	 of	displacement	 and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 the	 public	 invisibility	 and	 private	 visibility	 that	people	experience	with	shifting	borders.			
	
Shifting	borders	in	Sri	Lanka’s	and	Georgia’s	border-areas	Sri	Lanka	and	Georgia	have	experienced	shifting	borders	internally	and	geopolitically	that	have	received	varying	degrees	of	international	attention.	Their	histories	and	border-shifts	differ,	but	some	of	the	everyday	experiences	are	similar.	Both	conflicts	are	about	cessationist	claims,	where	one	group	fights	for	independence	from	the	state	in	which	they	are	embedded.	In	Sri	Lanka,	the	fight	for	a	national	homeland,	Tamil	Eelam,	for	the	Tamil	population	in	the	north	and	the	east	of	the	country,	came	as	a	result	of	colonial	and	postcolonial	experiences	where	the	minority	Tamil	population	felt	increasingly	marginalised	by	the	Sinhalese	dominated	state.32	A	number	of	militant	
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groups	emerged	during	the	1970s	of	which	the	LTTE	later	became	the	strongest.33	The	war	between	LTTE	and	the	Sri	Lankan	Armed	Forces	–	fought	between	1983	and	2009	created	border	areas	with	territories	fluctuating	between	LTTE	control	and	government	control.	In	the	territories	under	their	control,	the	LTTE	established	government-like	structures	that	would	operate	in	parallel	to	the	government	offices	that	stayed	in	place	in	the	war-zone	throughout	the	conflict.	LTTE’s	‘government	structures’	were	developed	further	during	a	ceasefire	agreement	between	2002	and	2005	and	they	had	their	own	court	system,	education	ministry	and	development	organisation.	The	LTTE	controlled	areas	even	operated	in	a	different	time	zone	from	the	Sri	Lankan	government	controlled	territories	(with	half	an	hour).	In	2007,	the	Sri	Lankan	armed	forces	gained	control	over	former	LTTE-controlled	areas	in	the	east	and	in	May	2009,	the	Sri	Lankan	armed	forces,	in	a	final	battle	in	the	north	of	the	country	had	more	or	less	eliminated	the	LTTE	as	a	militant	organisation	on	the	island	and	reinstated	a	one-nation	narrative.				South	Ossetia	was	recognised	as	a	separate	ethnoterritorial	region	by	the	Soviet	Georgian	republic	in	April	1922.34	It	got	the	status	based	on	its	distinctive	ethnic	composition	and	history	as	a	region	opposing	the	centralizing	tendency	of	the	Georgian	state.	With	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	establishment	of	the	new	nation	states	in	1991,	Georgia	abolished	all	autonomy	of	South	Ossetia	and	prepared	to	seize	its	territory.	35	There	were	several	attempts	by	Georgian	forces	to	take	control	of	South	Ossetia	in	1991	and	1992,	and	the	resulting	violence	left	20,000	people	displaced.36	An	agreement	between	Georgia	and	Russia	was	signed	in	1992	which	saw	the	establishment	of	a	joint	control	commission	consisting	of	representatives	from	Georgia,	Russia,	North-	and	South	Ossetia	and	the	Organisation	of	Security	and	Co-operation	in	Europe	(OSCE).	The	agreement	established	a	security	corridor	that	traversed	the	administrative	border	and	was	not	divided	into	separate	distinct	spaces	or	areas	of	control37.	Since	then,	the	Georgian-South	Ossetian	conflict	has	fluctuated	between	peaceful	moments	and	high-intensity	crises	with	thousands	dead,	maimed	and	displaced,	together	with	a	destroyed	infrastructure,	economy,	trade,	and	social	life	in	both	Georgia	and	South	Ossetia.38	Russia	has	played	a	complex	role	in	the	conflict,	and	is	one	of	few	countries	who	have	accepted	South	Ossetia	as	a	separate	state.	With	the	Rose	Revolution	in	2003	and	a	more	Russian-hostile	Georgian	government,	there	was	an	intensification	in	tensions.	In	2007,	Putin	offered	all	Ossetians	Russian	passports,	which	effectively	made	them	Russian	citizens.39	Increasingly	sour	relations	between	Georgia	and	Russia	resulted	in	a	war	between	Russia	and	Georgia	that	left	130,000	ethnic	Georgians	living	in	South	Ossetia	displaced	without	much	prospect	of	returning.40	At	the	same	time,	the	Georgians	living	on	the	Georgian	side	of	the	border	were	displaced	during	the	conflict,	but	as	I	show	later	returned	back	to	their	homes	after	the	war.		The	Council	of	European	Union	brokered	a	ceasefire	agreement	in	which	both	parties	agreed	to	withdraw	to	their	positions	from	before	the	hostilities.	A	Russian	peacekeeping	force	was	established	which	gave	Russia	access	to	a	buffer	zone	with	unclear	boundaries41	and	the	first	reports	of	barbed	wire	on	the	border	between	South	
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Ossetia	and	Georgia	followed	in	2011.	The	main	fencing	activity	by	Russian	forces	administering	the	border	started	in	2013,	splitting	villages,	cutting	off	access	to	agricultural	land	and	markets.42	Then	in	August	2015,	over	night,	the	border	moved	–	in	places	up	to	300	metres	-	into	Georgian	territory,	leaving	a	1,6	km	segment	of	the	oil	pipeline	between	Baku	and	Supsa	outside	Georgian	territory.43	In	some	villages	the	border	was	moved	during	daytime,	and	in	some	places	at	night.			
Studying	shifting	borders	The	engagement	with	different	geographical	settings	in	which	border-shifts	take	place,	have	 enabled	 a	 richer	understanding	of	what	 such	geopolitical	 practices	may	mean	 in	people’s	 everyday	 lives.44	From	both	 villages,	 I	 learnt	 the	 history	 of	 the	 place	 through	people’s	narratives.	Through	 the	narratives	 I	 situated	 the	bigger	geopolitical	events	 in	the	 locations	where	they	took	place	and	enabled	an	understanding	of	the	 local	context	through	which	the	borders	travelled.	In	addition,	and	because	I	was	keen	to	identify	the	chronological	 flow	of	events,	 I	searched	policy	documents,	various	online	news-outlets	and,	where	 available,	 academic	 literature	 in	 order	 to	understand	 the	wider	 context	 in	which	people	created	their	narratives.	In	addition	to	working	as	a	way	of	constructing	a	situated	account	of	shifting	borders,	 the	narratives	served	as	 ‘ontological	narratives’45,	through	which	I	gained	an	understanding	of	how	people	made	sense	of	and	negotiated	the	border	shifts.			There	were	many	differences	in	how	the	narratives	were	collected	in	the	two	villages.	In	Sri	Lanka,	I	conducted	several	periods	of	fieldwork	on	the	east	coast	between	2008	and	2011	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 university	 collaboration	 on	 post-war	 recovery	 that	 I	coordinated.46	Eastern	Sri	 Lanka	had	not	been	 the	 centre	of	 attention	of	 the	 conflict.	 I	decided	 to	 focus	 my	 own	 research	 within	 the	 project	 (particularly	 focusing	 on	displacement	 in	 conflict	 settings	 and	 the	 consequences	 post-conflict)	 in	 one	 village	which	I	will	term	‘the	Sri	Lankan	village’	here.	Through	numerous	qualitative	interviews	in	the	village,	I	realised	that	during	the	war,	the	villagers	experienced	that	their	homes	fluctuated	between	LTTE-	and	government-control.	In	order	to	understand	this	process,	I	adopted	a	life	history	approach	to	understand	how	war-time	experiences	had	shaped	people’s	 recovery	 after	 the	 war.	 In	 interviews,	 the	 shifting	 borders	 were	 used	 as	 a	reference	 point	 to	 help	 date	 a	 particular	 experience:	 an	 event	was	 described	 to	 have	taken	place	when	the	checkpoint	was	in	a	particular	location	as	a	way	of	remembering	when	 it	 had	 happened.	 After	 an	 initial	 life	 history	 interview	 with	 an	 individual	 or	 a	household,	 I	 often	 came	back	 to	 that	 same	household	 several	 times	over	 the	next	 few	years	 to	 chat,	 to	 catch	 up	 and	 to	 discuss	 further	 details	 of	 their	 daily	 life,	 their	 life	histories	and	the	shifting	borders.		In	Georgia,	my	research	did	not	first	and	foremost	concentrate	on	the	border	areas	but	on	protracted	internal	displacement.	I	first	started	collecting	data	in	Georgia	in	a	larger	evaluation	on	housing	for	the	internally	displaced	in	2003,	and	later	through	two	further	research	projects	on	long	term	displacement,	I	conducted	fieldwork	in	the	country	in	
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2010,	2012	and	2015.	Again,	life	history	interviews	and	follow	up	visits	over	the	years	from	2010	to	2015	were	my	main	methods	of	data	collection.	I	focused	mainly	on	people	displaced	from	Abkhazia,	but	I	would	also	encounter	and	interview	individuals	and	families	from	South	Ossetia.	Together	with	the	IDP	Women’s	Organisation	“Consent”	I	had	the	opportunity	to	interview	people	in	settlements	that	were	built	for	those	who	could	not	return	to	South	Ossetia.	In	December	2015,	during	two	visits	to	two	different	border-villages	on	the	Georgian	side,	I	participated	in	meetings	that	“Consent”	had	with	villagers	to	understand	the	conditions	in	which	they	were	living.	I	was	struck	by	the	similarities	in	experiences	and	narratives	that	I	had	heard	about	border-shifts	in	the	Sri	Lankan	village.	In	one	of	the	villages,	which	from	now	on	will	be	termed	‘the	Georgian	village’,	I	therefore	conducted	one	focus	group	discussion	and	talked	informally	to	people	in	the	village	during	a	one-day	visit	in	2015.	It	was	during	this	visit	that	I	was	introduced	to	the	experiences	of	the	shifting	border,	the	so-called	‘creeping	annexation’	that	people	in	the	area	had	experienced	a	few	months	earlier.			The	context	of	collecting	data	in	both	villages	were	one	of	militarization	and	securitization.	I	was	unable	to	stay	in	any	of	the	villages	overnight	–	or	any	lengthy	period	at	the	time	of	fieldwork.	For	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	this	resulted	in	many	journeys	up	and	down	the	coast	between	the	main	town	and	the	village.	While	the	data	collected	from	the	two	villages	differ	and	the	two	villages	themselves	are	very	different,	the	possibility	of	bringing	in	the	material	from	the	Georgian	village	helped	to	create	what	Cindi	Katz47	terms	a	‘countertopography’	of	border-shifts.	The	experiences	and	narratives	that	were	shared	with	me	in	both	places	helped	to	piece	together	an	understanding	of	the	experience	and	everyday-practices	of	geopolitical	processes	in	which	people	become	implicated.	By	following	the	same	contour-line	between	the	villages	in	Georgia	and	Sri	Lanka,	I	was	able	to	create	a	‘comparative	imagination’48	consisting	of	incomplete	analytical	insights	from	these	two	places.			
	
Lost	access	to	context	and	power:	the	material	impacts	of	the	shifting	border		In	both	cases	explored	here,	the	emerging	and	shifting	borders	affected	national	identities	as	much	as	leaving	marks	on	landscape	and	territory.	In	the	case	of	Sri	Lanka,	the	Sinhalese	nationalist	discourse	represents	Sri	Lanka	as	a	sacred	island	where	Buddhists	have	a	responsibility	to	preserve	Buddhism	and	associated	concepts	of	race,	land	and	nation	to	be	left	untouched	in	its	purity.49	For	Georgia,	Kabachnik50	has	shown	how	the	new	borders	and	the	breakaway	regions	create	wounds	and	scars	visually	on	the	maps	and	in	the	national	identity.		However,	the	borders,	marked	by	fences,	checkpoints,	military	installations,	landmines	and	flags,	also	constitute	a	materiality	that	restricts	the	actualisation	of	power	and	agency,	preventing	people’s	mobility,	and	taking	away	land	and	livelihoods	from	people.	These	are	material	changes	that	tie	in	with	processes	of	making	people	invisible	through	a	marginalization	that	effectively	removes	them	from	the	gaze	of	the	public.51	
	
	 9	
In	the	Georgian	village,	the	impact	of	the	shifting	border	was	explained	as	a	feeling	of	being	stuck:		 “The	family’s	development	stopped.	We	are	frozen	at	one	level.	We	are	tied,	don't	know	what	to	do.	We	are	like	in	a	prison.	There	is	no	place	to	run,	I	don't	know	what	to	do	–	we	only	exist	here.	If	we	just	had	a	small	room	in	Gori	[the	nearest	city]	we	could	live	in,	we	would	have	left”52.		In	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	an	interviewee53	reflected	on	how	her	family	had	lived	through	the	conflict	between	the	LTTE	and	the	Sri	Lankan	Armed	Forces:	“We	were	living	like	a	drum,	beaten	from	both	sides”.	Their	home	was	located	right	on	one	of	the	main	locations	of	the	recurring	borders	between	the	combating	parties.	The	family	lived	at	times	in	the	area	controlled	by	the	Sri	Lankan	Government,	and	at	other	times	in	the	area	controlled	by	the	LTTE,	but	most	of	the	time	they	felt	the	presence	of	both	militant	actors.	At	night,	LTTE	would	be	more	active	among	people,	visiting	their	homes,	asking	them	to	contribute	money,	food	and	other	assistance.	During	the	day,	the	government-forces	controlled	people’s	movements.	Both	the	LTTE	and	the	government	had	their	own	institutions	and	people	thus	had	to	relate	to	two	state-like	systems	in	their	everyday	lives.54		People	and	their	homes	become	targets	of	regulation	and	surveillance	in	the	name	of	ensuring	‘security’	(e.g.	economic,	physical,	cultural)	for	particular	populations,	most	often	the	economically	and	politically	privileged.55	However,	this	securitization	has	different	outcomes	in	the	two	villages.	In	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	power	relations	on	either	side	of	the	line	were	not	clearly	defined.	The	migrating	border	separated	Tamils	from	Tamils	–	not	necessarily	separating	one	group	from	the	other.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	border	in	itself	represented	the	Other	–	the	Sinhalese	state	–	and	the	line	between	the	minority	Tamils	and	the	majoritarian	Sinhalese	state.	Crossing	the	border	was	filled	with	anxiety,	fear	and	the	need	to	negotiate	identities.56			In	contrast,	the	shifting	border	in	the	Georgian	village	has	meant	the	conflict	has	literally	come	closer	to	people’s	homes.	People	can	hear	gunshots	when	the	soldiers	on	the	other	side	practice	their	shooting	skills:	a	constant	reminder	of	the	insecurity	people	live	with.	At	the	same	time,	the	barbed	wire,	and	later	the	fence,	that	was	erected	between	Georgia	and	South	Ossetia,	cut	people	off	from	crossing	the	border	and	consequently,	from	mobility	between	the	territories,	from	livelihoods	and	from	seeing	relatives	on	the	other	side.	The	moving	border	produces	fear	and	people	with	land	near	the	fence	do	not	feel	safe	to	cultivate	the	land	as	stories	of	kidnapping	by	border	guards	are	common.	Here,	the	‘Other’	has	to	a	larger	extent	than	in	the	case	of	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	become	a	geopolitical	concept	that	does	not	fully	resonate	with	people’s	practices.	The	material	practices	of	the	border	have	curtailed	contact	and	created	hostility,	separation	and	enemies.	Symbolic	practices	and	narratives	–	whether	true	or	not	–	have	helped	villagers	on	the	Georgian	side	to	confirm	their	marginal	position.	One	anecdote	recounted	how	people	on	the	other	side	of	the	border	(South	Ossetians)	led	their	waste-water	over	to	
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the	Georgian	side	and	into	villagers’	basements	to	destroy	the	year’s	harvest,	animal	fodder	and	other	provisions	and	adding	to	the	already	precarious	situation	that	people	are	experiencing.			In	both	villages,	the	material	and	symbolic	impacts	of	the	border-shifts	created	a	context	for	what	may	be	described	as	‘burdened	agency’.	In	the	following	sections,	I	show	how	subjects	in	the	borderlands	struggle	in	a	constrained	context	to	recreate	or	maintain	normal	lives	while	negotiating	conflicting	powers.57			
Invisibility	through	Displacements	‘in	Place’		People	in	the	border	areas	in	Sri	Lanka	and	Georgia	represent	immobile	groups.	In	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	the	people	who	stayed	during	the	war	were	those	who	often	did	not	have	the	resources	to	move	elsewhere	in	the	country	or	abroad.	During	the	war	the	LTTE	would	often	tell	all	people	in	the	village	to	go	away	for	a	couple	of	days	during	fighting.	People	would	move	to	the	jungle	for	a	couple	of	days	before	returning	to	their	homes,	often	to	find	that	the	checkpoints	and	border	had	shifted	location,	their	houses	damaged	or	looted,	but	with	no	place	to	go,	no	access	to	assistance,	and	with	no	other	choice	than	to	try	to	move	on	with	life.		As	I	showed	above,	people	in	the	Georgian	village	also	feel	stuck.	When	the	border	moved	in	2015,	people	were	taken	by	surprise.	People	whose	land	was	now	on	the	other	side	of	the	fence	were	given	a	few	weeks	after	the	border	had	moved	to	collect	their	harvest.	In	both	cases,	the	shifting	border	created	particular	feelings	of	displacements:	as	a	“simultaneously	split	and	double	existence	–	stretched	across	the	multiple	ruptures	between	‘here’	and	‘there’”.58	With	the	shifting	border,	the	definition	of	‘here’	and	‘there’	changed.	As	Lubkeman59	has	shown,	those,	who,	during	war	are	forced	to	remain	in	place,	or	just	move	away	for	shorter	periods	of	time,	tend	to	suffer	more	than	those	who	move	away	to	places	where	they	may	be	closer	to	the	centre	and	are	given	more	attention	as	subjects	of	assistance.	The	suffering,	also	materialises	in	the	various	ways	in	which	people	in	the	borderland	confronts	and	sustains	the	pressure	that	comes	from	shifting	borders.		During	the	2008	war,	people	in	the	Georgian	village	experienced	kidnapping	and	physical	violence,	leading	to	a	number	of	casualties.60	Displacement	was	frequent,	and	the	sudden	experience	of	not	being	protected	by	the	state,	not	knowing	who	in	the	local	community	they	could	trust,	and	not	feeling	welcome	elsewhere	in	the	country	created	a	sense	of	invisibility	and	of	being	forgotten	by	fellow	citizens.		Most	people	in	the	village	moved	away	for	a	short	time	during	the	conflict.	They	stayed	in	temporary	collective	centres	in	kindergartens	and	other	institutions	while	they	were	waiting	to	return:			
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“We	were	assisted	by	the	government	[during	displacement].	But	not	from	the	beginning.	The	capital	didn't	believe	in	our	need	to	get	out	of	our	areas,	but	when	the	war	came	close	to	Tbilisi,	then	people	realised	the	danger	and	more	assistance	was	directed	towards	us	at	the	time.	But	in	the	beginning	they	told	us:	“Why	didn't	you	stay	back	and	protect	your	communities?”	But	then	when	the	bomb	fell	in	Tbilisi,	then	they	understood.	People	were	mobilised.	The	1990s	IDPs	also	helped61.	They	opened	the	bathrooms	for	us.	They	knew	our	situation.”62		When	the	war	was	over,	people	whose	properties	were	in	villages	on	the	Georgian	side	of	the	border	had	to	go	back	to	their	places.	Ethnic	Georgians	displaced	from	South	Ossetia	could	not	return	and	were	provided	with	housing	in	new	settlements	along	the	main	road	between	Tbilisi	and	Gori	and	close	to	the	border.63	Upon	return	to	the	Georgian	village,	some	people	found	their	houses	destroyed,	while	most	had	been	damaged	in	some	way.	During	the	first	two	years	they	received	some	humanitarian	aid	such	as	food	and	firewood.	People	in	the	Georgian	village,	however,	felt	that	they	were	not	treated	as	real	displaced	people	as	they	had	not	moved	for	long	and	could	return.			
	
Outside	the	gaze:	speechless			
	“Its	all	psychological	at	the	moment.	Every	night	we	can	hear	the	shooting	in	the	night,	we	feel	that	we	are	constantly	in	a	war	situation.”64		Some	borderlands	are	located	outside	the	grip	of	institutions	that	govern	from	the	centre.	In	such	spaces,	there	may	be	a	state	of	opportunity	or	lawlessness.65	These	interstitial	zones	may	represent	freedom	and	opportunity,	sites	where	there	is	a	possibility	for	change	and	that	are	“lively	but	not	entirely	safe”66,	but	at	the	same	time	they	are	highly	constrained	spaces.	In	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	when	people	came	back	from	their	days	of	displacement	during	the	war,	the	government	forces	questioned	them:	“Where	did	you	go,	who	asked	you	to	go?”	Survival	was	linked	to	learning	how	to	speak,	how	to	answer	the	questions	by	the	government	forces,	and	how	to	deal	with	the	multiple	requests	from	the	LTTE.	“What	was	your	strategy	to	survive?”	I	asked.	“Not	to	be	seen”	an	interviewee	responded.	The	less	seen	and	the	more	invisible,	the	less	trouble	one	would	experience.	Invisibility	becomes	the	last	resort	when	other	forms	of	protection	are	not	available,	a	strategy	adopted	when	the	border	shifts	are	unpredictable	and	the	powers	inhabiting	the	borderlands	volatile67.	Making	oneself	invisible	takes	place	through	ways	of	speaking,	dressing	and	presenting	oneself	to	ensure	self-protection.68	On	the	contrary,	the	people	in	the	Georgian	village	felt	that	they	were	made	invisible.	I	asked	people	if	they	had	protested	when	the	border	moved.	The	interviewees	said	that	they	had	not	protested	directly	to	the	soldiers	when	it	happened,	but	they	had	protested	with	official	letters	and	a	list	had	been	made	of	those	people	who	lost	their	lands.			
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Invisibility,	as	a	strategy	in	the	case	of	Sri	Lanka	and	as	enforced	invisibility	imposed	by	the	state	in	Georgia,	was	coupled	with	what	Arendt	understands	as	a	natural	visibility.	This	created	exposure	in	their	homes	–	a	sense	of	not	being	safe	in	their	dwellings.	Fear	–	and	these	specific	relations	of	subordination	–	structured	people’s	view	of	the	options	available	to	them.69	In	the	Sri	Lankan	village,	invisibility	was	not	only	a	strategy	people	took	on	themselves,	it	was	also	imposed	on	them.	War	and	the	shifting	borders	deprived	people	of	the	Sri	Lankan	village	of	a	voice,	their	strategy	to	survive	was	to	be	silent	and	invisible.	They	could	not	pursue	their	citizenship	and	concomitant	rights70.		In	the	Georgian	village,	the	fear	that	accompanied	the	shifting	border	was	a	predominant	emotion	that	governed	daily	life	and	contributed	to	render	people	speechless,	passive	and	with	few	possibilities	to	invest	in	a	future	in	the	borderland	where	they	feel	stuck.					
Conclusions:	public	invisibility,	natural	visibility		Theorising	borders	becomes	a	way	of	analysing	the	social.	In	the	context	of	border-shifts,	I	have	shown	that	despite	the	continuous	feeling	of	being	stuck,	people	in	the	borderlands	develop	capacities	to	act	within	the	particular	set	of	restrictions	that	the	changing	borders	create.	By	living	and	surviving	in	the	borderlands,	people	become	the	crossroads	as	Anzaldúa’s	poem	shows.	People	inhabiting	the	borderland	represent	the	‘intersection	of	two	or	more	roads’71:	the	central	node	at	which	geopolitical	powers	fight	for	sovereignty	and	dominance.	These	borderland-subjects	relate	to,	negotiate	with	and	mediate	between	different	powers	at	the	same	time,	they	represent	the	points	at	which	different	scales	come	together.	Crossroads,	however,	may	also	refer	to	the	crucial	point	where	‘decisions	are	being	made	with	far-reaching	consequences’	72.	By	living	in	the	borderlands	and	experiencing	the	split	existence	between	here	and	there	as	the	borders	shift,	people	contribute	to	constitute	the	border	by	the	day-to-day	decisions	they	are	forced	to	make	to	sustain	their	lives.	Decisions	to	avoid	or	confront	border-practices,	making	themselves	(in)visible,	come	into	interaction	with	the	geopolitical	actors	dependent	on	the	border-subjects	to	maintain	their	power	and	create	particular	processes	of	peripheralisation.			In	the	Sri	Lankan	village	on	the	east	coast,	the	war	ended	in	2007,	people	moved	back	home	to	a	one	nation	narrative,	determined	to	rebuild	their	lives.	After	years	of	militarisation,	shifting	borders	and	checkpoints,	people	could	gradually	live	with	less	fear.	Life	had	become	easier,	they	said,	because	of	the	presence	of	only	one	master.	However,	the	invisibility	continued	in	multiple	ways	and	the	area	is	still	one	of	the	most	marginal	and	poorest	of	the	country.	In	January	2017,	when	I	revisited	the	village,	I	learnt	that	language	is	a	most	significant	symbolic	marker	of	the	afterlife	of	the	material	and	shifting	borders	during	the	war.	People	in	the	Sri	Lankan	village	speak	Tamil	and	most	people	cannot	read	or	speak	Sinhala.	However,	most	officials	in	police	and	local	government	officers	will	only	speak	and	write	letters	in	Sinhala.	People	continue	to	be	rendered	peripheral	and	invisible.	The	border	areas	continue	to	be	spaces	of	existential,	
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social,	political	and	legal	limbo	where	disturbing	memories	of	past	conflict	and	violence	are	mapped	onto	present-day	socio-economic	asymmetries	and	inequalities.73			Similarly	in	Georgia,	the	significance	of	people’s	physical	presence	in	the	borderland	for	Georgia’s	geopolitical	and	national	narrative	shapes	the	nature	of	their	invisibility.	As	this	paper	has	shown,	the	border	is	far	from	just	a	line	through	a	territory.	‘Borderization’	is	as	much	about	information	and	image	as	about	military	capacity.74	Control	over	territories	takes	place	through	intimidation	and	threats.	It	is	not	a	military	invasion	but	a	“creeping	occupation”	and	subsequent	take-over	of	strategic	positions	in	breakaway	regions.	Reality	and	representation	are	specially	and	intimately	linked.75	Border-practices	continue	to	produce	people	in	the	borderlands	as	the	Other	and	the	borderlands	are	marginal	spaces,	where	people	negotiate	their	everyday	spaces	through	burdened	agency.	There	is	a	constant	feeling	of	uncertainty,	low	trust	and	being	exposed	to	conflict	and	different	forms	of	violence.			The	particular	production	of	invisibility	is	noticeable	in	both	cases,	but	may	not	be	the	same	in	other	cases	of	shifting	border.	In	the	two	cases	presented	here,	the	role	of	invisibility	also	differs.	Unpacking	the	tensions	between	visibility	and	invisibility	helps	to	understand	the	processes	through	which	the	borderlands	and	the	subjects	who	inhabit	them	are	rendered	peripheral.	I	have	shown	how	these	contingent	processes	take	place	through	material	impacts	of	border	shifts,	the	experience	of	‘displacement	in	place’	and	the	invisibilities	produced	in	the	border	areas	in	the	context	of	the	fear	for	the	multiple,	contradicting	and	intersecting	power	relations	that	people	have	to	relate	to.76	The	public	recognition	–	and	visibility	that	would,	in	Hannah	Arendt’s	understanding,	earn	people	individual	rights	and	protection	is	currently	out	of	reach	for	people	in	the	borderlands	who	are	publicly	invisible.77	An	engagement	with	feminist	geopolitics	enables	a	mode	of	interrogating	and	exposing	the	grounds	for	knowledge	production78	that	takes	place	in	the	periphery.	With	the	comparative	imagination	across	the	two	villages,	I	have	produced	a	countertopography	of	border	shifts.	The	unpacking	and	exposure	of	violence	and	the	production	of	suffering	that	the	shifting	borders	produce	could	be	used	to	re-claim	some	the	accompanying	rights	that	come	with	public	visibility	and	recognition.	The	public	recognition	–	and	visibility	that	would,	in	Hannah	Arendt’s	understanding,	earn	people	individual	rights	and	protection	is,	however,	currently	out	of	reach	for	people	in	the	borderlands.79																																																														1	Without	borders	
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